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A B S T R A C T
We empirically reveal how environmental experts interpret the objectivity norm while navigating the
authority paradox. The paradox here is that while there is a need for objective scientiﬁc advice, such
advice is only to be acquired from experts and expert agencies whose objectivity and, hence, authority are
contested. Viewed through the lens of practice, we identify what practitioners at the PBL Netherlands
Environmental Assessment Agency understand by objectivity. Using this paradigmatic case, we show
how practitioners renegotiate the meaning of objectivity while seeking to engage with new policy actors
and extended peers in an independent, rigorous and legitimate manner. Successfully navigating the
authority paradox is related to skilfully representing and adapting to various meanings of objectivity.
Experts and experts agencies accordingly need reﬂexive skills to recognise which meanings of objectivity
they ascribe to and which ones are invoked in public debates. Environmental experts who are able to
loosely connect diverse objectivity conceptions are more likely considered as trustworthy and
authoritative partners in environmental science-policy interfaces.
ã 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND
license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
Contents lists available at ScienceDirect
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For government expert agencies to properly perform their role
as credible and inﬂuential science-policy interfaces, it is vital that
their authoritativeness is publicly recognised. Do government
expert agencies generate new ways of demonstrating their
authority, given that in present-day society their public legitimacy
– grounded in claims of objectivity – is often publicly challenged?
Drawing on empirical work, particularly in the ﬁeld of climate
science and politics (Beck et al., 2014; van der Sluijs et al., 2010), we
can say that this hardly seems to be the case; on the contrary, the
norm of objectivity seems to be reinforced by the media, as well as
by scientists and the expert agencies themselves.
Experts typically seek to conform to identity norms, like
objectivity, when approaching their task (Hilgartner, 2000).
Tracing the historical and cultural origins of objectivity reveals
that over time the word ‘objective’ has acquired different meanings
and associated scientiﬁc practices (Daston and Galison, 2007).* Corresponding author at: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency,
Bezuidenhoutseweg 30, 2594 AV, The Hague, The Netherlands.
E-mail addresses: eva.kunseler@pbl.nl, evakunseler@gmail.com
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1462-9011/ã 2016 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uThere is no single deﬁnition that captures the meaning of
objectivity and new meanings are added as practices change over
time, giving objectivity its irreducible complexity (Douglas, 2004).
In science-policy interfaces objectivity plays a dual role in
distinguishing valid policy-relevant knowledge from mere politics.
Objectivity in the sense of what counts as proper scientiﬁc
representation of nature, and objectivity in the sense of the role of
public interests and values in the reasoning process. This double
objectivity, scientiﬁc and political, is achieved through institution-
al projections of credibility and truth to policy makers and other
audiences (Jasanoff, 2011). Institutionalised forms of scientiﬁc
advice to governments, therefore, routinely commit to objectivity
as a central identity norm to ensure that the advice has credibility
and inﬂuence in society, thus assuring their authoritativeness
(Bijker et al., 2009; Hilgartner, 2000; Jasanoff, 2005).
Institutional responses to credibility crises in scientiﬁc advice to
governments, e.g. the Climategate affair, signal that expert
agencies like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) wish to restore public faith in their autonomy, openness and
disinterest. They employ ‘repair’ strategies by increasing the
transparency of their scientiﬁc procedures and extending peer
review to include non-scientiﬁc peers in the assessment process.
The IPCC’s relationship to public policy and its various global
‘public’ audiences is hardly subjected to critical debate (Beck et al.,nder the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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of the IPCC remains unchallenged and unreﬂexively guides a global
and science-based understanding of climate change, subordinating
plural and local understandings of climate change to a singular
technocratic framework (Turnhout et al., 2016).
We have conceptualised this situation as an ‘authority
paradox’1: large uncertainties and value conﬂicts reinforce the
need for authorities who can speak in the name of an objective
science at a time when the objectivity of experts and expert
agencies is subjected to public scrutiny. Public challenges of the
objectivity of expertise are undermining the authority of scientiﬁc
experts. The paradox here is that while there is a need for objective
scientiﬁc advice, such advice can only be acquired from experts
and expert agencies whose objectivity and, hence, authority are
contested (Bijker et al., 2009; Gluckman and Wilsdon, 2016).
Institutionalised forms of scientiﬁc advice to governments are
faced with this paradox. Government expert agencies increasingly
have to operate in disparate multi-actor and multi-level settings
where policy issues – especially in the environmental ﬁeld – are
marked by severe political pressure, disputed values, high stakes in
decision-making and very large epistemological and ethical
system uncertainties (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1993).
How do the experts themselves navigate the authority
paradox? This question is best examined in situations where
experts start actively questioning, challenging and innovating their
practices, while they aim to safeguard their credibility and
inﬂuence as an authority.
In this paper we present an empirical study to show how
practitioners in a Dutch government expert agency, the PBL
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (Planbureau voor
de Leefomgeving – PBL), interpret the objectivity norm when
considering their role as credible and inﬂuential experts in today’s
constantly changing governance settings and issue conﬁgurations.
Taking the PBL as a paradigmatic case (Flyvbjerg, 2006), this
paper sheds light on the wider problem of persistent technocratic
and science-based environmental knowledge production systems
(Turnhout et al., 2016). Participatory or transdisciplinary modes of
knowledge production have proven hard to establish due to
disciplinary traditions and expert-driven research cultures in the
home institutions of experts (Mattor et al., 2014; Sternlieb et al.,
2013). There is a tendency in environmental science-policy
interfaces to institutionalise new modes of knowledge production
in accordance with prevailing values of scientiﬁc independence
and autonomy (Lovbrand, 2011; Van der Hel, 2016). In practice,
therefore, these attempts appear to deviate little from, and can
even reinforce, a technocratic style of working (Reinecke, 2015;
Turnhout et al., 2013). Experts tend to “do [ . . . ] more of the same
under a different name” ((Van der Hel, 2016): 173). The lens of
practice, in this paper adds a new perspective to institutional
tensions in science-policy interfaces by illustrating the complexity
of the objectivity norm (Douglas, 2004). In the next section, we will
introduce the PBL as a paradigmatic case for government expert
agencies seeking to navigate the authority paradox. We then
explain our methods of data collection and analysis. The empirical
section of the paper shows how PBL practitioners start questioning,
challenging and innovating their practices and develop new1 Bijker et al. (2009) introduce the paradox of scientiﬁc authority to investigate
how the Health Council of the Netherlands manages to maintain its position of
scientiﬁc authority, while that authority seems to be deteriorating in the rest of
Dutch society. Hajer (2009) introduced the authority paradox to explain how “the
phenomenon of media 24/7 multiplies the attention for the classical-modernist
political centre at a time at which crucial problems often spill over jurisdictions,
disempowering the political centre” (p.176). Both Bijker et al. and Hajer showed how
the paradox expresses itself in institutional settings whose classical-modernist
roots are challenged by appeals for democratisation.meanings of objectivity at the same time. The paper concludes by
pointing out how the authority paradox may be successfully
navigated by experts in environmental science-policy interfaces.
2. The PBL as a paradigmatic case
The PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency can
serve as a paradigmatic case (Flyvbjerg, 2006) for government
expert agencies seeking to navigate the authority paradox. Using
this case, we can learn something about the way practitioners
conform to the identity norm of objective science, while they start
to consider and evaluate their assessment approaches and expert
roles in today’s advisory setting of constantly changing governance
and issue conﬁgurations. This section introduces PBL’ position at
the Dutch science-policy interface and illustrates its responses to
credibility crisis in the past.
The PBL is the Dutch national institute for strategic policy
analysis in the ﬁelds of the environment, nature and spatial
planning. It is a government-funded expert agency that aims to
“contribute to improving the quality of political and administrative
decision-making by conducting outlook studies, analyses and
evaluations in which an integrated approach is considered
paramount.” PBL holds the legal status of a policy assessment
agency with “a prime concern to generate policy-relevant studies
in an independent2 and scientiﬁcally sound manner” (PBL, 2016).
PBL’s activities fulﬁl a traditionally-determined authoritative
role for a small group of professional representatives and
government. First and foremost, PBL works closely with govern-
ment departments that oversee its operation and research
capacity. PBL is presented in the public debate as a powerful
institute that disciplines policy-makers into rational policy
making; using impartial calculation methods to assess policy
goals and options in a way which is neutral and non-partisan
(Halffman and Hoppe, 2009). The rhetoric of objectivity is
deployed not only by the agency itself (Kunseler, 2016), but also
by politicians and policy-makers who seek to correct one another
with claims of expertise. They accept PBL’s knowledge as ‘best
guess’ statements to create the playing ﬁeld in which they operate
and bargain, because “questioning this would lead to a swamp of
policy unpredictability” (de Vries, 2008).
While the authoritativeness of the PBL is ﬁrmly grounded in its
legal (de jure) position as an independent government expert
agency, in practice PBL practitioners tend to deﬁne their expert role
ﬂexibly when dealing with different clients and public audiences,
by skilful boundary work (Hoppe, 2009; Huitema and Turnhout,
2009; Pesch et al., 2012). In this way they can ensure that there is
an organisational ﬁt with a policy ﬁeld or issue based on PBL’s
mandate to produce science-based policy-relevant studies. Au-
thoritativeness in such dynamic boundary processes comes from
playing a credible role in a succession of concrete situations. This
creates a de facto (real) authority alongside PBL’s de jure (legal)
authority (Hajer, 2009, 2012), which then leads to the accumula-
tion of epistemic authority over time.
Nonetheless, PBL’s credibility has been called into question on
several occasions e.g. when errors became evident or when PBL
was accused of an ideological or political bias. Against the
background of today’s complex governance settings and issue
conﬁgurations, PBL can expect to increasingly face potential
credibility issues, especially as uncertainties and value controversy2 This independence is laid down by law in the Regulation for Policy-Analysis
Agencies, article 4, which states that Dutch policy-assessment agencies (planbur-
eaus) are solely responsible for the content and quality of their work and that
policy-makers should refrain from interfering with research content and methods
(Staatscourant, 2012).
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changing constellations of actors. Besides working with govern-
ment departments and parliament, PBL has to relate to civil society
stakeholders, as well as supra-national and regional levels of
government, each of which bring their own claims, stakes and
values to the assessment process (Halffman, 2009).
When credibility has been contested in the past, this has led PBL
to formulate new strategies and procedures to deal with
uncertainties and perspective plurality. This is illustrated by PBL’s
methodology guidelines for uncertainty assessment and commu-
nication, stakeholder participation, scenario building and peer
review (Dammers et al., 2013; Hage and Leroy, 2008; Kunseler
et al., 2014; Petersen et al., 2013). Despite the mandatory status of
these guidelines as part of quality assurance procedures, a
methodological support unit and training in the use of these
guidelines, they are not always fully utilised in PBL projects. There
still seems to be insufﬁcient understanding in the organisation
concerning the basic values and beliefs underlying these guide-
lines, and limited room to accommodate them given PBL’s
institutionalised interface position (Petersen et al., 2011). It
appears paradoxical that PBL practitioners learn to reﬂect upon
organisational routines in order to detect unnoticed biases and
unbalanced framing (reﬂexive logic3), but remain committed to
institutionalised beliefs in science-politics demarcations, objective
science and scientiﬁc privilege (modernist logic) (Kunseler, 2016).
Illustrative of this paradox in the PBL context is an example
described by PBL’s former director (from 2008 to 2015), Maarten
Hajer, a renowned scholar in public policy and political sciences. A
deliberative assessment process had to restore public trust in
climate science4 but – in his view- nearly split PBL in two:
“Between February and July 2010 some 35 researchers at the PBL
contributed to an investigation of the IPCC’s fourth assessment
report, checking the text for more errors. This assignment nearly
split the institute (in total some 250 full-time equivalent
[personnel] (FTE), of which approximately 200 FTE researchers)
in two. About half the academic staff were convinced this was an
assignment that could only do damage to the IPCC and would lead
to the demise of the PBL as an internationally respected research
institute; the other half argued there was no choice and we should
act on a parliamentary request in a responsible way. A small
subsection of the latter half saw it as a challenge and regarded it as
an important experiment in an attempt to ﬁnd a new form of
scientiﬁc governance.” ((Hajer, 2012): p. 455)
Without going into further detail, this example strikingly
illustrates how the use of a deliberative approach to generate and
restore PBL’s authority appeared to invoke practical concerns
among the majority of the PBL population and experimental
enthusiasm among a few. In the remainder of this article we will
focus on these practical concerns and explore how they reﬂect
interpretations of the objectivity norm.
3. Research design
Seen through the lens of practice, organisational practices are
always open to contestation and this keeps them continuously in a3 Under a reﬂexive logic practitioners reﬂect upon frames of reference including
disciplinary, institutional and cultural routines, norms and beliefs. They acknowl-
edge the limits of scientiﬁc prediction and control prevalent under a modernist
logic, and come to grips with a socially contingent understanding of knowledge in
society (Kunseler, 2016).
4 PBL was tasked by the Minister of Infrastructure and the Environment with
reviewing the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report in response to media debate about
mistakes in the regional assessment part. For this purpose PBL organised an
extended peer review process in which critical peers and public parties were invited
to contribute to the review of potential mistakes.state of tension and change. This view is broadly placed in what has
been termed ‘the practice turn’ in social theory (Nicolini, 2012). It
was inspired by developments in sociology as well as in science
and technology studies. This practice approach is suitable for the
study of science-policy interfaces as a social practice (van den
Hove, 2007), because it takes social structures and institutions, like
the objectivity norm, not simply as given but considers how they
are interpreted and re-interpreted in the day-to-day work of social
actors. Thus, from the practice perspective, changes in scientiﬁc
advice to government arise from processes that are rather difﬁcult
to steer or predict (Arts et al., 2014). Zooming in on practical
concerns directs attention towards the dynamic between inven-
tion and improvisation and the limits imposed by institutionalised
norms and conditions. A focus on practical concerns enables us to
appreciate PBL’s practices as acts of ‘bounded creativity’: “the
variety of ways in which [practitioners] can creatively engage with
the practical concerns set up by a practice is bounded by the limits
imposed by external conditions and criteria of accountability”
(Nicolini, 2012): 226).
To surface the practical concerns which govern and affect PBL
practitioners, and to appreciate them from their perspective the
design of our research is informed by an interpretive, naturalistic
approach which enables us to “study things in their natural setting,
attempting to make sense of, or interpret, phenomena in terms of
the meaning that people attribute to them” ((Denzin and Lincoln,
2013), p.3). We identiﬁed the varied and multiple meanings that
PBL practitioners attribute to objectivity as they emerge from the
practices carried out in the PBL organisation. Their interpretations
and the interaction between them provided the basis for our study
(Creswell, 2003). We made use of participatory observation and
document analysis of informal discussions in PBL. We also
conducted interviews with practitioners about the challenges
they face in their daily work. Our material was derived from three
in-house activities that PBL practitioners could take part in on
voluntary basis. Although the activities were not necessarily
restricted to a discussion of PBL’s roles and the design and quality
of deliberative assessment approaches in today’s critical society, as
it turned out, concerns related to these matters attracted
considerable attention. These three in-house activities were:
1. A seminar on expert roles, organised on 18 January 2011, with
the aim of developing a more sophisticated understanding by
some 40 participating PBL practitioners of their own expert
roles. The session reports and ﬁnal meeting report served as
material for our research. We further drew on ten interviews
which we and others conducted with ten project leaders prior to
the seminar, asking for their own experience of science-policy-
society interactions. More details are available in a PBL working
paper (de Wit et al., 2014).
2. An internal strategy project conducted from spring 2014 to
spring 2015 with the aim of reﬂecting upon the implementation
of open assessment methods and tools in PBL activities (in the
PBL context this term refers to methods and tools that increase
transparency concerning uncertainties and perspective plurali-
ty). The research was conducted by an external consultant who
interviewed 13 PBL practitioners (mainly methodology and
modelling experts) about their experience of and reﬂections on
open assessment in the PBL context, and two external
methodology experts about the theory of open assessment
methodology.
3. A PBL course with eight PBL practitioners (mainly project
leaders) who discussed their experiences on interacting with
policy actors and stakeholders. The aim of the course was to
enable PBL practitioners to gain a clearer understanding of
recent insights in science-policy literature. The course consisted
of reading of science-policy literature, three working sessions
4 E.-M. Kunseler, W. Tuinstra / Environmental Science & Policy 67 (2017) 1–7and individual assignments and was conducted from autumn
2014 to early spring 2015.
Our involvement in these activities as co-organisers (EK and WT
activity 1), coordinators (EK activity 2; WT activity 3) and
participants (EK, all activities; WT, activity 2) enabled us to
observe and experience the practical concerns of PBL practitioners.
Experience and proximity to the reality studied lie at the very heart
of case study research (Flyvbjerg, 2006) and help to provide insight
into the contingent and partial processes of organisational change
and innovation (Pallett and Chilvers, 2014). Intersubjectivity is an
important asset in interpretive inquiry, given that the interpreta-
tion of meanings and relationships can have different connotations
depending on one’s own points of reference (Burawoy, 1998). We
ensured intersubjectivity in dialogue among ourselves, by member
checking quotes with participants, and with qualitative content
analysis to guide our search for patterns across the data (Weiss,
1995). Firstly, we selected excerpts that point to dilemmas on how
to sustain PBL’s authority as a credible and inﬂuential science-
policy interface in a critical society. Secondly, we identiﬁed how
practitioners discussed these dilemmas, and we analysed how
their practical concerns reﬂect their interpretations of objectivity.
4. The complexity of the objectivity norm
We identiﬁed three types of dilemmas: how to engage with
policy actors, how to work with extended peers and stakeholders
and how to justify new role interpretations. These three dilemmas
are presented as questions in column 1 of Table 1. In discussing
these dilemmas, we see how PBL practitioners seek to assure
objectivity, which reveals the various interpretations of objectivity
within the PBL organisation (column 2).
4.1. How to appropriately balance distance from and engagement with
policy actors?
Questions raised during the role seminar illustrated that
practitioners seek to strike the right balance between maintaining
a distance from and engaging with policy actors other than
government departments, to guide their role in changing gover-
nance conﬁgurations: “to what extent are regional and local
governments allowed to request advice from PBL, now that policy
tasks in the ﬁeld of nature, spatial planning and the environment are
largely decentralised?” And “can PBL act as a direct adviser to the
European Commission?” And “how to position ourselves in relation to
non-government actors, such as businesses, who are involved in policy
processes?” (quote derived from activity 1)
On the one hand they recognise the advantages of deliberation
with these policy actors to facilitate policy learning and to ensure
the balance with respect to a spectrum of values (value-neutrality).
The following quote illustrates that a focus on policy learning and
value-neutrality is seen to match PBL’s mission as an independent
intermediary at the science-policy interface:
“The strength [of PBL] lies in discussing issues outside frameworks.
Its strength is to set the agenda. This is what I am often told [byTable 1
Overview of ﬁndings from the empirical analysis, illustrating dilemmas raised by p
interpretations of objectivity reﬂected in these dilemmas.
Dilemmas raised by PBL practitioners 
How to appropriately balance distance from and engagement with policy actors? 
Do extended peers and stakeholders contribute to or rather limit the scientiﬁc quality 
PBL assessments?
Do different role interpretations than those traditionally expected put the legitimacy 
the PBL at risk?policy-makers]. PBL employees are judged on the basis of those
four studies that add more perspective to what policy-makers are
concerned with on a daily basis. PBL therefore has to be able to act
as an independent intermediary.” (1)
Engagement with policy actors facilitates policy learning, but it
requires an independent position in order to make judgements (i.e.
recommendations) that are balanced towards the various stakes
and values represented by the parties involved: “The width of the
programme, the various government levels involved and the
independent role of PBL allow room for us, as an independent party,
to make critical recommendations to the various parties.” (2) And she
adds: “As we do have some ‘weight’ now, this is going well.” (2)
Conversely deliberative approaches are also considered risky
given the importance of sustaining PBL’s independent position:
“You see what happens from less of a distance; the mirror of
independence is less evident. You become a part of the whole. You have
to be highly alert in such processes. On the one hand you want to
conduct participatory research in order to invoke learning. But on the
other hand this implies that you become dependent on others for this
to happen. And you become part of it, at least a bit. Researchers do not
like it if you move too far in this direction.” (2)
Thus, engagement calls into question PBL’s detachment from
politics and the particular beliefs advocated in these processes:
“The external world perceives our engagement with the actors
involved in policy preparation as different from what would be
expected [i.e. a more distant stance] . . . while external parties
essentially should see PBL as an independent broker.” (2) In order to
safeguard an independent position, PBL should therefore refrain
from political interference: “We cannot become part of the process
[i.e. of policy negotiation and formulation]” (1). Ensuring the
objectivity of PBL seems to require clear demarcations between
PBL’s role as a provider of independent knowledge and the political
processes in the policy network or system
This leads us to conclude that the dilemma of how to strike a
balance between distance from and engagement with policy
actors, reﬂects practical concerns on how to ensure the indepen-
dence of the knowledge generated in deliberative assessment
processes. The usage of the term independence reveals interpre-
tations of objectivity related to the role of values in the assessment
process. On the one hand, independence is assumed to be
necessary in order to create distance from points of view advocated
in political and governance processes. Detachment assures that
deliberative assessment processes generate objective outcomes.
While engagement with these same policy actors is perceived as
necessary to generate objective – in the sense of value-neutral –
scientiﬁc advice that facilitates policy learning, since it balances
the various views and accordingly adds (critical) perspectives to
political debates.
4.2. Do extended peers and stakeholders contribute to or rather limit
the quality of PBL assessments?
The core business of the PBL is to produce science-based
assessments. In so doing, PBL practitioners carefully manage theractitioners at PBL the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency and the
Interpretations of objectivity reﬂected within dilemmas
Addressing the role of values in deliberative assessment processes
of Addressing the rigour of the knowledge that is generated in deliberative
assessment processes
of Addressing the legitimate design and implementation of deliberative
assessment processes
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that they are inevitably subject to bias themselves. Extended peer
review is therefore considered a crucial quality assurance strategy:
“Does our environmental idealism inﬂuence our work? Inevitably
there is a bias, but the question is how you deal with it? The idea would
be to organise your own criticism in all phases of your project and
involve different stakeholders in doing so. This way, you can neutralise
the bias.” (1)
While supporting extended peer review, the dilemma practi-
tioners experience is how to organise extended peer review in such
way that it enhances quality without limiting the rigour of the
assessment process, as the following quote illustrates: “I am a
proponent of extended peer review, but you have to channel it and
actively manage it: what is it you want a response to and from whom?
Otherwise you won’treceive a response but only trigger ‘conﬂict’. In an
ideal world, a research project is like architecture designed in a public
space where everyone can respond to inspire the architect.” (3)
There is a tendency among PBL practitioners to place extended
peers in a subordinate position, where they may be ‘invited’, but
not ‘steer’ or ‘co-produce’ the assessment process: “Co-production
brings opportunities and risks: do we have enough distance? Can we
maintain our line of argument? In unstructured5 [i.e. value laden and
highly uncertain] situations you need to adopt a position to be able to
present a clear line of argument.” (3) PBL practitioners aim to ensure
control over deliberative assessment processes which they justify
in terms of the need for ‘a clear line of argument’, the rigour of
which they believe may be put at risk when extended peers play a
more prominent role.
Even when stakeholders are given a more prominent role
during the framing of assessments, PBL practitioners apply
scientiﬁc procedures to exclude speculations from the process:
“In the stakeholder dialogues on urban sustainability we asked them
[i.e. stakeholders] to underpin their views6with reference to evidential
relationships, such as the health effects of environmental problems.
Themes raised during the dialogue underpinned with less clear
evidence, such as ﬂexibility, freedom of choice and social cohesion
were scientiﬁcally processed [i.e. using expert consultation and
scientiﬁc literature review] after the meeting.” (2)
Based on our analysis we may conclude that deliberation with
extended peers and stakeholders raises quality concerns. Practi-
tioners’ interpretations of objectivity are reﬂected in their views on
how to sustain the rigour of the knowledge that is generated in
these processes. Extended peers and stakeholders are seen to
contribute to the rigour of the assessment outcomes on the one
hand. Deliberations trigger reﬂection upon institutionalised
frames of reference, and prevent bias or normative framings to
go unnoticed. On the other hand PBL practitioners want to control
the quality of stakeholders’ contributions and tend to impose
scientiﬁc standards and procedures to generate reliable knowl-
edge.
4.3. Does adopting different roles than those traditionally expected put
the legitimacy of the PBL at risk?
Adopting different roles than those traditionally expected is
perceived as putting the legitimacy of the PBL at risk, as certain
roles may contradict one another. Several questions raised during
the role seminar illustrated these practical concerns: “How to5 When using the notion of unstructured problems, PBL practitioners refer to
Hisschemöller and Hoppe (1996) who deﬁne four types of problems along two axes,
reﬂecting the level of agreement about values and certainty about knowledge.
Unstructured problems are deemed to be far from certain and far from agreement.
6 It is important to note here that it was not possible on the basis of our material
to distinguish between PBL practitioners’ valuation of input from stakeholders with
regard to their arguments and their world views.remain independent assessors while actively assisting in policy and
public debates as well?” and “How to act both as an independent
assessor and strategic adviser in the same policy ﬁeld?” (1).
For example, when involved in policy development and then
evaluating the same policy later, PBL might be seen as a “butcher
judging his own meat” (1). The outside world may accordingly
consider the mission of the institute ambiguous: “the untrustwor-
thy chameleon” (1).
PBL practitioners want to safeguard their legitimacy, while new
roles may challenge this position: “The outside world perceives our
closer involvement with policy preparation as a ‘special role’, which is
seen as a change in which you need to maintain your independent
role.” (1)
As they see it, new roles are nevertheless useful in unstructured
problem settings. In these settings, PBL practitioners perceive the
need for deliberation across knowledge perspectives and for
convergence towards a convincing result: “If you deal with
unstructured problems you have to interact with politics and policy
and with people offering knowledgeable contributions in order to get
to an action perspective.” (2)
When practitioners practice such new roles they experience
considerable implications for their work process  they need to
make use of novel methods and organise the assessment process
differently than they are used to, as the following two quotes
illustrate:
“During the workshop this was noticeable; the experts [i.e. the PBL
practitioners] did not adopt their old roles. Which was difﬁcult
once we experienced the implications on our work. For example,
how should I design my presentation now that it will not be the
focus of the workshop? We do not ‘determine’, but ‘follow’. You are
put outside your comfort zone, which we are not used to. As a
presenter in such a workshop you are no longer sure of what to
present, since someone else may have said it already.” (3)
“Reﬂexive monitoring7 allows you to discover why something
works well or not in the process. These are also your research
ﬁndings. It is a different methodology that gives different types of
results. If it turns out during the process that there is no support for
the concept [i.e. the issue framing] from the actors involved, then
this is your research ﬁnding; which is somewhat awkward for the
researchers at PBL.” (2)
These quotes illustrated how practising new roles raises
legitimacy issues that relate to the design of the assessment
process (e.g. the use of reﬂexive methods and ‘open’ presentations)
and the conditions for deliberative assessment processes (e.g. the
power dynamics between PBL and participating actors).
Thus, new roles seem to be justiﬁed when PBL practitioners can
contain and deﬁne these new roles in a legitimate manner. Their
interpretations of objectivity relate to the legitimacy of the design
and implementation of deliberative assessment processes. New
roles give more prominence to interaction and discussion among
participants which may generate objectivity interactively; that is
deliberation helps to eliminate predetermined framings from the
assessment process. New roles are also considered risky given the
importance of PBL’s independent stance (in the sense of
detachment, see dilemma 1). Objectivity in this sense implies
that a certain degree of distance (from points of view advocated in
political and governance processes) has to be maintained in
deliberative assessment processes to assure the legitimacy of the
outcomes it produces. Ensuring the objectivity of PBL is thus7 Reﬂexive monitoring (van Mierlo et al., 2010) was recently introduced as a new
mode of assessment in the PBL context. The method supports systems innovation in
transdisciplinary research settings.
6 E.-M. Kunseler, W. Tuinstra / Environmental Science & Policy 67 (2017) 1–7considered to be a matter of seeking to adopt new roles in a
legitimate manner.
Overall, we may conclude that the complexity of the objectivity
norm provides for both stability and ﬂexibility in practices of
government science advising. Practitioners’ interpretations of
objectivity seem to be guided by external conditions, on the one
hand: “The PBL mission is deﬁned and informs our practices, but we
can see that things change and that questions change. In principle this
would allow us to work differently.”(2) While on the other hand they
act as agents of change for themselves in creating and inventing
novel approaches, which adds new meanings of objectivity to their
repertoire: “Would it perhaps be possible to include special practices,
for example, the advisory practice of ‘knowledge at the table8 as part
our advisory repertoire? Could PBL develop new products relating to
these special roles and which are recognisable to the outside world?”
(1)
5. Navigating the authority paradox?
We have shown that PBL practitioners hold a deep and complex
understanding of the objectivity norm, which supports their
position as a credible and inﬂuential government expert agency
operating at the Dutch environmental science-policy interface. By
emphasising on independence, rigour and legitimacy they seek to
ensure that their advice has credibility and inﬂuence in society,
thus assuring their authoritativeness. Seen through the lens of
practice, we showed how the objectivity norm of what is deemed
as independent, rigorous and legitimate knowledge was situation-
ally interpreted, in view of particular practical concerns. New
meanings of objectivity are added in circumstances where this
serves to increase relevance and credibility. Engagement with
policy actors becomes necessary to generate independent – in the
sense of value-neutral – scientiﬁc advice that facilitates policy
learning. Extended peer review becomes necessary to improve the
rigour of the assessment outcomes as it prevents bias or normative
framings to go unnoticed. New roles become necessary to give
prominence to interaction and discussion among participants
which may improve the legitimacy of the assessment process.
Conversely, practitioners still often interpret objectivity conform
the prominent 19th century representation of ‘objectivity as
scientiﬁc truth’ (Daston and Galison, 2007). Practitioners empha-
sise on independence to distance themselves from points of view
advocated in political and governance processes; and on scientiﬁc
rigour to control the quality of stakeholders’ contributions in order
to generate reliable knowledge.
The practice view in this article, in effect, explains, in our view,
why experts tend to do more of the same under a different name
(Turnhout et al., 2016, 2013; Van der Hel, 2016) . Institutional
representations of the objectivity norm cannot be changed
overnight, while at the same time, when experts ‘improvise’ they
tend to stretch the boundaries of what is ‘appropriate’. PBL
practitioners creatively engage with the dilemmas they raise
within the limits imposed by the institutional setting. A sense of
‘ﬁt’ and human agency often go together in intuitively bringing
new modes of knowledge production to fruition (Regeer, 2009).
This leads to diversiﬁcation of approaches, identities and roles in
government science advising. In our case, PBL practitioners
acknowledged that serving the Dutch government with appropri-
ate knowledge in a 21st century critical society inevitably requires
them to explore the added value of deliberative modes of
assessment. The practical concerns that accompany this process8 The advisory practice of ‘knowledge at the table’ involves participation in policy
deliberations as an independent knowledge resource.of change reﬂect how internalised notions of objectivity become
ﬂexible in usage.
Practitioners in this case highlighted both scientiﬁc and
political accounts of objectivity (Jasanoff, 2011); their interpreta-
tions related to the quality of knowledge, the role of values and the
design of assessment processes. They loosely connected these
different meanings of objectivity. Loose connections such as these
tend to provide coherence to organisational practices (Douglas,
2004).
To navigate the authority paradox successfully is related, thus,
to skilfully representing, elaborating and correcting meanings of
objectivity that have been brought to the fore (Hajer, 2009).
Experts should be well aware of their own usage of the term, but
also of the meanings invoked by others. Interpretations of
objectivity in practices of government science advising not
necessarily interconnect with the ways other practices – such as
governance or media practices – invoke the term. The complexity
of objectivity allows room for its ﬂexible usage, but may as well
lead to strong normative debates on the (lack of) trustworthiness
of expertise (Douglas, 2004). This is exactly what happens during
credibility crises. Once objectivity of expertise is called into
question, the basis for trust is gone. In order to restore a sense of
trustworthiness, experts need to be able to relate to many different
publics and work together different meanings under a shared idea
of objectivity (Douglas, 2009; Hajer, 2009). Training in reﬂexive
skills may help experts in recognising which meanings of
objectivity they ascribe to and which ones are invoked in the
debate. Environmental experts who are able to loosely connect
diverse objectivity conceptions are more likely considered as
trustworthy and authoritative partners in environmental science-
policy interfaces.
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